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Abstract
I develop a dynamic model of optimal funding to understand why liquid nancial assets are
used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds. Firms need funds to invest in risky projects
with non-veriable returns. Since holding these assets allows rms to raise these funds, rms
with investment opportunities value the asset more than those without them. When investment
opportunities are persistent, borrowers value the asset as a future funding source and optimally
use liquid nancial assets as collateral. Assets carry (funding) liquidity and collateral premia.
As market liquidity increases, the liquidity premium increases while the collateral premium
decreases.
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1 Introduction
Collateralized debt is a widely used form of nancing. Trillions of dollars are traded daily in debt
collateralized by diverse nancial assets, such as sale and repurchase agreements (repos) and collat-
eralized over-the-counter derivative trades (see Gorton and Metrick (2012a), Gorton and Metrick
(2012b), and Copeland et al. (2012)). Many nancial institutions use collateralized debt to raise
funds that allow them to provide intermediation services. Some of them are private depository in-
stitutions, credit unions, mortgage real estate investment trusts, and security brokers and dealers.
Most of these institutions use the collateralized borrowing as a source of nancing.
Crucially, the assets that are o¤ered as collateral in collateralized derivative trades, "sold" in
repos or pledged by specialty lenders to raise funds are liquid nancial assets assets that could
also be sold in nancial markets. In contrast to physical assets which are used as collateral to
raise funds, such as family heirlooms that are pawned or real estate used to obtain credit lines, the
intrinsic value of these nancial assets is independent of the identity of the assetsholders. Then,
why do so many nancial institutions choose to use these nancial assets as collateral instead of
selling them to raise funds?
In this paper, I show that borrowing rms choose to collateralize liquid nancial assets (rather
than selling them) when the return of their investment is not contractible and investment opportu-
nities are persistent. The non-contractibility of the investment returns implies that asset transfers,
either in the form of asset sales or collateralized debt, are necessary for the rm to raise funds.
Therefore, in equilibrium, the nancial asset is more valuable to rms with investment opportu-
nities. The persistence of the investment opportunities implies that borrowing rms value the
asset more than the lenders because it allows them to raise funds and invest in the future. This
endogenous di¤erence in valuations leads to collateralized debt being optimal and to borrowers
collateralizing liquid assets.
I develop these insights in a dynamic model of optimal funding. More specically, in the baseline
version of my model there are two periods and two risk-neutral agents, a borrower (rm) and a
lender. There is also a storable consumption good and one long-term nancial asset which pays
dividends each period. The main di¤erence between the nancial asset and the consumption good
is its pledgeability. While the asset is fully pledgeable, consumption good holdings are not.1 Each
1More generically, one could relax this assumption as long as the pledgeability of the asset is higher than the
pledgeability of the consumption good.
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period, the borrower can invest in a risky project. This project is protable in expectation but it
incurs losses if it is not successful. The main friction in the model is that the return on the risky
project is private information of the agent who invested in it and it is not veriable. Therefore,
this return is not contractible. The borrower has his investment opportunity before the nancial
assets dividends are paid and, thus, cannot invest without external nancing. This timing implies
that, if left in autarky, both the borrower and the lender would value the asset by the expected
discounted sum of dividends.
In order to raise funds and take advantage of his investment opportunity, the borrower enters
into a short-term state-contingent contract with the lender. Because the return of the risky project
is not contractible and the project may incur losses, the borrower cannot issue unsecured debt
and he needs the pledgeable asset to raise funds to invest. Therefore, the non-contractibility of
the projects return, together with the persistence of investment opportunities, implies that the
borrowers valuation for the asset is higher than the value assigned by the lender. To see this,
suppose that an agent in this economy will have an investment opportunity tomorrow. Holding the
asset tomorrow will allow the agent to invest in the project either by selling the asset or by pledging
it as collateral. Being able to raise funds against the asset in the funding market implies that an
agent with an investment opportunity tomorrow will value the asset more than an agent without
an investment opportunity. If investment opportunities and, thus, the role as borrower and lender
are persistent, as it is the case in many collateralized debt markets, it follows that the agent who
is a borrower today will value the asset higher tomorrow than the lender will.2
This di¤erence in valuations leads to the borrower optimally choosing to use liquid nancial
assets as collateral in the rst period. If the borrower sells the asset, he can invest the net present
value of the assets dividend  the lenders valuation  in his risky project. If, instead, the borrower
pledges the asset as collateral, he has incentives to repay more than the lenders valuation in order
to keep the asset. The borrower only has "extra" consumption goods if the project in which he
invested is successful. Therefore, using the asset as collateral makes part of the unobservable
return of the risky project pledgeable and the borrower is able to invest more in his risky project
by pledging the asset as collateral than by selling it.
Intuitively, when the borrower values the asset more than the lender does, selling the asset to
2This persistence is consistent with the observation that, in many collateralized debt markets, di¤erent types of
institutions specialize in borrowing or lending. For example, in the repo market, money market funds are usually
lenders whereas hedge funds and specialty lenders are usually borrowers.
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the lender is costly for the borrower. For each unit of the asset the borrower transfers to the lender,
the borrower gets at most the lenders valuation, which is less than his own. Alternatively, to raise
the same amount of funds, the borrower can promise to transfer consumption goods in an amount
equal to the lenders valuation of the asset. Since the lenders valuation of the asset (in terms of
consumption good) is lower that the borrowers, the borrower nds it less expensive to increase
his funding by transferring consumption goods to the lender rather than assets. Using the asset
as collateral allows the borrower to transfer the asset only in the states in which he does not have
enough resources to repay the lender in consumption good.
The di¤erence in valuations for the asset between the borrower and the lender, which is crucial
for the result, arises endogenously and, as I show in this paper, it depends on whether the borrower
and the lender can trade assets for consumption good after the investment opportunitys return is
realized. In Section 3, I extend the baseline model to allow for the possibility that a competitive asset
market may be available at the end of the rst period. Considering this market serves two purposes.
First, it provides a deeper understanding of the assumptions behind the endogenous di¤erence in
valuations, which is at the center of the main result that borrowers choose to collateralize liquidity,
i.e., that borrowers strictly prefer to use the liquid asset as collateral rather than selling it to raise
funds. Second, it allows me to consider how the assets market liquidity a¤ects the nancing choice
of the borrower, as well as the liquidity and collateral premia.3
The probability with which the market is available, which I refer to as the assets market
liquidity, is a key determinant of the marginal valuations of the asset for the borrower and the
lender. As one would expect, assets with higher market liquidity allow the borrower to invest more
in his project. Moreover, as long as the assets market liquidity is not perfect, that is, as long as
there is some probability that the market will not be open, the borrower values the asset more than
the lender and, thus, strictly prefers to use the asset as collateral over selling it.4
The extra value the borrower assigns to the asset on top of the expected discounted value
of dividends can be decomposed in two premia: a (funding) liquidity premium and a collateral
premium. The liquidity premium arises from the borrower being able to sell the asset and use
3Follwing Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) I dene the assets market liquidity as the ease with which the asset
can be traded and the assets funding liquidity as the ease with which the borrower can raise funds by selling the
asset.
4Even the most liquid securities, such as US Treasuries, can become illiquid in the even of a market freeze like the
one experienced during the 2008  2009 nancial crisis.
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the funds to invest in his investment opportunity. The collateral premium is the additional value
the borrower can obtain by using the asset as collateral instead of selling it. Interestingly, the
assets market liquidity has opposite e¤ects on the asset premia: it increases the (funding) liquidity
premium while it decreases the collateral premium.
An increase in the assets market liquidity increases the assets liquidity premium through two
channels. First, it increases the value the lender can get for the asset, which increases the amount of
funds the borrower can raise from the lender by selling his asset. Second, it increases the probability
with which a borrower can use the proceeds of his risky project to buy assets which increases the
borrowers value of an additional unit of funding. Both of these channels lead to an increase in the
value the borrower attaches to selling the asset and, in turn, to a higher funding liquidity premium.
On the other hand, an increase in the assets market liquidity decreases the collateral premium.
The higher the probability of the market for assets being open, the smaller the di¤erence in val-
uations between the borrower and the lender. The smaller this di¤erence, the less costly it is for
the borrower to transfer the asset to the lender and the lower the additional value the borrower
attaches to being able to use the asset as collateral.
In the baseline two-period model, the borrower and the lender enter short-term contracts. In the
paper, I show that the short-term collateralized debt contract characterized in the baseline model
implements the optimal long-term contract. Intuitively, the main di¤erence between short-term
and long-term contracts is that, in long-term contracts, future loan amounts can be contingent on
the current repayment by the borrower. However, since in short-term contracts the loan amount the
borrower can get each period depends on his asset holdings, collateralized debt indirectly contracts
on future loan amounts by making the asset transfers state contingent.
Finally, I extend the baseline model in several dimensions. First, I make the asset risky and
allow for the dividends to be correlated with the return of the borrowers investment opportunity.
An increase in this correlation increases the assets debt capacity since it makes it costlier for
the borrower to default. It also makes the asset better collateral. Second, I make the access to
investment opportunities stochastic. As long as the access to investment opportunities is persistent,
the asset will optimally be used as collateral. Lastly, I extend the baseline model to an innite
horizon model. This extension shows that future collateral premia amplify the current one and,
thus, further increase the amount that can be borrowed against the asset.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a microfoundation for the use of nancial
assets as collateral by focusing on the borrowers optimal nancing choice. The paper is related
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to the large literature concerning the optimal nancing of investment projects. For example, in a
setup with asymmetric information about the quality of a productive asset, Gorton and Ordoñez
(2014) show that short-term collateralized debt is optimal if lenders are willing to accept the asset
as collateral without acquiring information about it. They show that this is the case if the prior
about the quality of the asset used as collateral is high enough. My paper di¤ers from Gorton and
Ordoñez (2014) in three ways: (1) I consider nancial assets (as opposed to physical productive
ones), (2) I allow for asset sales, which they do not consider, and (3) there is perfect information
about the quality of the asset in my model.
Within the literature on optimal nancing, this paper is closely related to papers that consider
incomplete contracts, either due to private information or moral hazard, in which the optimal
contract features collateralized debt. In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), the optimal contract is a
long-term contract in which the lender commits to liquidate the borrowers rm if default occurs.
In Lacker (2001), non-pecuniary costs of default are assumed while in Rampini (2005), default
penalties are modeled as transfers of goods only valued by the borrower. Gale and Hellwig (1985),
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1998) also nd optimal contracts that resemble
collateralized debt. They follow Townsend (1979) and allow for costly state verication to partially
resolve the agency problems. In all of these papers, including my paper, the optimal contract
involves some credible punishment for the borrower if the bad state is realized, which incentivizes
him to behave, and report the state truthfully. The main contribution of my paper is that the cost
of default for the borrower, which is the key determinant of the optimality of collateralized debt,
arises endogenously and is not assumed.
In my model, contracts are incomplete but perfectly enforceable.5 However, as Barro (1976)
shows, enforcement frictions can also give rise to collateral contracts in equilibrium. Along these
lines, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Chan and Kanatas (1985), and Kocherlakota (2001) analyze col-
lateral as a mechanism to enforce contracts and deter default. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) explore
the e¤ect of collateral constraints on the business cycle, while Rampini and Viswanathan (2010)
and Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) examine the capital structure of the rm. In most of these
papers, the assets that are used as collateral are either illiquid or they are inputs of production,
so selling them to raise funds is not an option. In contrast, in my paper the asset that is used as
collateral in equilibrium is a liquid nancial asset.
5Hart and Moore (1985) study the optimal contract in the presence of incomplete contracts that can be renegoti-
ated.
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One of the main advantages of deriving collateralized debt as part of the optimal contract is that
the amount that can be borrowed against the asset, its debt capacity, is an equilibrium outcome.
In this regard, my paper is also related to the endogenous leverage literature based on the general
equilibrium models developed Araujo et al. (1994), Geanakoplos (2003a,b), Geanakoplos and Zame
(1997), and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008). In these models, the collateral requirements are also
equilibrium outcomes. However, in contrast to my paper, in these papers the contract space is
restricted to collateralized debt.
The mechanism I describe in this paper can be applied to multiple types of debt collateralized
by nancial assets, including repurchase agreements. Other papers that look specically at repo
markets are Du¢ e (1996), Monnet and Narajabad (2012) and Gottardi et al. (2016). Du¢ e (1996)
argues that di¤erences in the transactions costs between selling an asset and entering a repurchase
agreement justify the use of the latter. Monnet and Narajabad (2012) look at a search model in
which agents prefer to conduct repurchase agreements than asset sales when they face substantial
uncertainty about the exogenous private value of holding the asset in the future. In Gottardi et al.
(2016), repos allow the borrowers to insure the initial buyer of the asset against price uctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present the baseline two-period
model and highlight the mechanism behind the main result. In Section 3, I expand the baseline
model by considering the possibility of a competitive asset market. Section 4 shows that the optimal
short-term contracts implement the optimal long-term contracts. In Section 5, I present several
model extensions that display the robustness of the main result. I conclude in Section 6. All
omitted proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Baseline model
In this section, I present a baseline two-period model that highlights the forces behind the main
result that borrowers strictly prefer to use nancial assets as collateral rather than selling them
to raise funds. This baseline model emphasizes the sources of the assets funding liquidity and
collateral premia that are at the core of the mechanism that makes collateralized debt optimal.
2.1 Environment
There are two periods, t = 1; 2, and two risk-neutral agents, a borrower (B) and a lender (L), with
a common discount factor,  2 (0; 1). There is one non-pledgeable, storable consumption good and
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one pledgeable, long-lived nancial asset in the economy.6 a units of the asset yield da units of
consumption good as a dividend at the end of each period t. The lender is endowed with a large
amount of consumption good e in each period t. The borrower is endowed with aB1 units of the
nancial asset in the rst period and has no consumption good endowment. Instead, in each period,
the borrower has access to a risky constant return, short-term project. One unit of consumption
good invested in the project at the beginning of period t yields a random payo¤ t 2 fL; Hg at the
end of the period, where L < H . The projectsreturns are i.i.d. over time, where the probability
distribution over the returns is given by i  Pr (t = i) for i = L;H. Though the risky project
is protable in expectation, 1 < E (t)  LL + HH , it incurs losses if the low state is realized,
0 < L < 1. I denote by high (low) state the state in which t = H (t = L).
The risky projects realized payo¤ is only observed by the borrower. However, the lender knows
the projects return structure. More specically, the lender knows that the borrower will get a
return of at least L per unit invested. Therefore, the borrower can credibly pledge the low return
of the project to the lender but the extra return H   L the project yields if the high state is
realized is inalienable and not pledgeable.
The borrower can save either by storing consumption good or by holding the asset. However,
given the di¤erences in pledgeability, the borrower always prefers to save by holding assets. Since
consumption good holdings are not pledgeable, the borrower cannot lever up against them. Then,
the expected return of each unit of consumption good with which the borrower enters the second
period is E (). In contrast, asset holdings are pledgeable and, thus, the borrower can borrow
against them. For each unit of value held in the asset the borrower can raise at least 11 L to invest
in his project. Since the low return of the risky project is pledgeable L is common knowledge
the expected return on the funds borrowed against the asset is E ()   L. Then, for each unit
of value held in the asset that the borrower brings to the second period, he expects a return of
(at least) E() L1 L . Since
E() L
1 L > E (), the borrower is always better o¤ saving in terms of the
asset rather than saving consumption good. Importantly, this implies that any convenience yield
the nancial asset may have is not driven by the assets durability the consumption good and the
asset can both be stored but by its pledgeability.7
Assumption 1 (Impatience) The discount factor  satises E () < 1.
6The results in the paper extend to the case in which the consumption good is pledgeable as long as the pledgeability
of the consumption good is lower than the nancial assets.
7See Rampini (2016) for a discussion of the di¤erences between pledgeability and durability.
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- B chooses funding contract
- L transfers funds to B
- B invests in risky projects
- Return t is realized - B settles funding contract
- Assets dividend d is paid
Period t
Figure 1: Timing
Assumption 1 implies that the borrower always chooses to consume the proceeds of the risky
project rather than saving them to invest in his project in the future. The borrower can transfer
wealth between periods either by storing consumption good or by holding the nancial asset.
However, given Assumption 1, the borrower nds it suboptimal to store consumption good and will
always choose to begin period 2 with no consumption good. Therefore, I will ignore the borrowers
consumption good saving decisions in the remainder of the paper.8
At the beginning of each period t; the borrower and the lender enter into a short-term funding
contract in which all bargaining power is given to the borrower. After the terms of the funding
contract have been determined, the borrower invests in his risky project. Once the return of the
project is realized, the terms of the contract are settled and the nancial assets dividend is paid.
This timing is depicted in Figure 1.
The (nancial) assets dividends are paid after the investment is made. This timing has two
important implications. First, if left in autarky, the borrower and the lender value the asset equally
as the discounted sum of its dividends. There is no intrinsic di¤erence in asset valuations between
the borrower and the lender. Second, the borrower needs to get funds from the lender in order to
take advantage of his investment opportunity.
Denition 1 (Short-term funding contract) A short-term funding contract consists of a fund-
ing amount in terms of consumption goods, q, contingent repayments in terms of consumption goods,
ri, and in terms of asset transfers, ti, i = L;H: Repayments in terms of assets include the transfer
of the contemporaneous assets dividends.9
8Given the linearity of the model, Assumption 1 is made for convenience. Since consumption good saving decisions
do not interact with the borrowers funding choice, the results in the paper remain valid if this assumption is relaxed.
9This assumption is without loss of generality since the dividends are observable and, thus, pledgeable.
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In the context of the funding contract in Denition 1, I will interpret non-contingent asset
transfers as asset sales and contingent asset transfers as collateralized loans in which the asset
is transferred if default occurs. More specically, when tL 6= tH ; part of the asset transfers are
contingent and the funding contract can be implemented using collateralized loans, as follows. If
tL < (>) tH , the repayment of the collateralized part of the loan is jrH   rLj in terms of consumption
goods in the high (low) state, when there is no default, and jtH   tLj in terms of asset transfers in
the low (high) state, when default occurs.
The set of transfers implied by any contract to which the borrower and lender agree to have to
be feasible given the resources held by both parties.
Denition 2 (Feasibility) A short-term contract (q; rL; rH ; tL; tH) is feasible in period t if
0  q  e
0  ri  d (at   ti) + iq i = L;H
0  ti  at i = L;H
where at is the amount of assets held by the borrower in period t.
The rst constraint in Denition 2 states that the funding amount q has to be non-negative and
that it cannot be larger than the lenders endowment of the consumption good. The second set of
constraints implies that the state contingent repayments in terms of consumption goods cannot be
negative, nor can they be more than the amount of the good the borrower has at the end of the
period in each state after the asset transfer ti. Similarly, the third set of constraints implies that the
borrower cannot transfer more assets than the amount he holds and does not allow the borrower
to purchase assets from the lender at the time of settlement. In the model developed in Section 3,
I consider the case in which the borrower can use the proceeds of this investment opportunity to
purchase assets.
The non-contractibility of the returns of the risky project is the key friction that gives rise to
collateralized debt in equilibrium. Since the return of the risky project is only observed by the
borrower who invested in it and it is not veriable by the lender, it is not contractible. This means
that the loan contract between the lender and the borrower cannot be contingent on the realization
of the return, t. However, a contract can be made contingent on the reported return of the risky
project as long as it is incentive compatible.
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Denition 3 (Incentive Compatibility) A contract (q; rL; rH ; tL; tH) is incentive compatible in
period t if whenever rL  Hq + d (a  tL)
  rL   dtL + V Bt+1 (a  tL)   rH   dtH + V Bt+1 (a  tH) (ICH)
and whenever rH  Lq + d (a  tH)
  rH   dtH + V Bt+1 (a  tH)   rL   dtL + V Bt+1 (a  tL) (ICL)
where V Bt+1 (a) is the value for a borrower with a units of the nancial asset in period t+ 1:
If the borrower reports state i as being realized, he transfers ri units of the consumption good
and ti units of the nancial asset to the lender. Since the transfer of the asset also implies the
transfer of the assets dividends, transferring ti units of the asset decreases the borrowers current
consumption in dti, on top of reducing the stock of capital with which the borrower begins the
following period.
The rst constraint ICH states that, in the high state, it is always at least as good for the
borrower to tell the truth and report that the high state has occurred than to lie and report a low
realization of . The second constraint ICL states the analogous for the low state. Note that the
constraints ICH and ICL are only active when lying in the low state is feasible (i.e., when there
are enough resources in the low (high) state to match the contingent repayment in terms of goods
promised in the high (low) state, rH (rL)).
Three features of the model are worth emphasizing:
Financial assets. The long-lived asset a is a nancial asset. It is not related to the project
available to the borrower: the asset is not an input needed to operate the project. This assumption
di¤erentiates this paper from other papers of collateral in which the asset used as collateral is a
physical asset, which is physically needed to operate the borrowers technology and, thus, cannot
be sold without forgoing access to the investment opportunity.
Pledgeability. The main di¤erence between the consumption good, which can be interpreted
as cash, and the nancial asset is its pledgeability (recall that both the asset and the consumption
good can be stored). While the borrower can commit to transferring the asset at the time of
settlement, the consumption good is non-pledgeable. If one thinks of examples of cash that are
pledgeable, such as cash in escrow, one can see that, in most cases, these are nancial assets since
cash is securitized in order to be pledged. Moreover, this assumption implies that the borrower
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prefers to transfer value across periods by saving in assets instead of in consumption goods, as
discussed above.
Asset sales and liquidity. Though there is no formal market for the asset at the beginning
of the period, the borrower can always sell his asset holdings at a price equal to the present value
of its dividends by setting tL = tH = a and rL = rH = 0, which satises feasibility and incentive
compatibility. Therefore, the durable nancial asset is liquid it can be sold at the time at which
the borrower makes his nancing decision.
2.2 Equilibrium
In this section, I dene and compute the equilibrium of the baseline model. I start by looking at the
last period and show than the asset carries a (funding) liquidity premium for the borrower since it
allows him to raise funds to invest in his risky project. Then, I look at the equilibrium in the rst
period and get to the main result that borrowers strictly prefer to use nancial assets as collateral
rather than selling them to raise funds.
2.2.1 Second period
In the second period, t = 2, the borrower chooses a feasible, incentive compatible, short-term
contract to maximize his expected consumption. He invests the loan amount q in his risky project
which yields an expected return E () q. The borrower expects to repay LrL + HrH in terms of
consumption goods and to transfers ti units of the asset if state i = L;H is realized. Finally, he
also gets the dividends paid by his asset holdings, da. Thus, a borrower with assets a solves the
following problem in period 2:
V B2 (a) = max
q;rL;rH ;tH ;tL
E () q   L (rL + dtL)  H (rH + dtH) + da;
subject to the short-term funding contract (q; rL; rH ; tH ; tL) being feasible and incentive compatible,
and satisfying the lenders participation constraint:
q  L (rL + dtL) + H (rH + dtH) :
Proposition 1 The equilibrium short-term funding contract in period 2 is given by:
q2 (a) =
da
1  L ,
r2L (a) = Lq

2 (a) , t

2L (a) = a, and
r2H (a) + dt

2H (a) = q

2 (a) for any t

2H (a) 2 [0; a] ,
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and it can be implemented by a combination of risk-free debt at zero interest rate and either asset
sales or collateralized debt.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward. Since the asset has no value after the second
period, incentive compatibility in the second period implies that the funding contract is risk-free
for the lender, i.e., rL + dtL = rH + dtH . Moreover, the borrower promises to repay the maximum
amount he can credibly commit to repaying in the low state, i.e., rL + dtL = da + Lq. This,
together with the participation constraint for the lender, implies:
q2 (a) = L (r

2L (a) + dt

2L (a)) + H (r

2H (a) + dt

2H (a)) =
da
1  L :
As the Proposition 1 states, there are many transfer schemes through which the borrower can
implement the optimal funding contract. In what follows, I will concentrate on the implementation
with the maximum amount of risk-free debt.
Lemma 1 In any implementation of the equilibrium funding contract, the interest rate on risk-free
debt has to be zero.
In any implementation, lenders have to be indi¤erent between lending at the risk-free rate and
taking on some risk. Since the expected return of the optimal loan contract for lenders is 0 (the
participation constraint for the lender is binding), the risk-free rate has to be zero.
Corollary 1 In period 2, the borrower is indi¤erent between selling his assets and pledging them
as collateral.
The maximum amount that the borrower can repay the lender in consumption goods indepen-
dent of the realized state is r2L (a) (note that r

2L (a)  r2H (a)). Since the risk-free rate is zero, the
maximum amount of riskless debt is r2L (a). The remaining part of the loan amount, q

2 (a) r2L (a),
can be thought of either as the proceeds from asset sales, i.e., setting t2L = t

2H = a, or as debt
collateralized by a units of the asset, i.e., setting t2L = a and t

2H = 0. This shows that the borrower
is indi¤erent between selling his assets and pledging them as collateral in the second period.
Funding liquidity premium The value for a borrower of holding assets a in period 2 is:
V B2 (a) = (E ()  L)
da
1  L > da:
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In the second period, the borrower values the asset more than the dividends it pays since having
the asset allows him to raise funds and take advantage of his investment opportunity. Since the
returns of the risky project are non-contractible, without the asset, the borrower would only be
able to credibly commit to repaying the lender L < 1 per unit borrowed and, therefore, the lender
would never agree to providing an unsecured loan. Having the asset allows the borrower to pledge
the assets dividends, either by selling the asset or by using it as collateral, which in turn allows the
borrower to lever up. In this case, even if the borrower always reports the low state being realized,
the lender can collect Lq + da. For every unit of dividend the borrower has, he can raise 11 L
units of funds from the lender. Thus,
q2 (a) =
da
1  L :
Finally, since the return in the low state L is always pledged by the borrower, the borrower gets
an expected return E ()  L per unit invested in his risky project. Thus, the borrowers marginal
valuation of the asset at t = 2 is E() L1 L d > d. This extra value the borrower attaches to the asset
is what I refer to as a (funding) liquidity premium. It is the additional value the borrower gets
from being able to raise funds by selling the asset at the beginning of the period and investing the
proceeds from the sale in his risky project. The funding liquidity premium is dened as follows:
vB2   d =
E ()  1
1  L d;
where vB2 is the borrowers marginal value of the asset at the beginning of t = 2. The liquidity
premium is equal to the levered expected excess return of the risky project times the fundamental
value of the asset.
Remark If the borrower was not able to sell the asset at the beginning of t = 2; he would
value it d and the liquidity premium would be zero.
2.2.2 First period
Analogous to the problem in the second period, in the rst period the borrower solves
V B1 (a) = max
q;rL;rH ;tH ;tL
E () q L (rL + dtL) H (rH + dtH)+da+LV B2 (a  tL)+HV B2 (a  tH) ;
subject to the short-term funding contract (q; rL; rH ; tH ; tL) being feasible and incentive compatible
and satisfying the lenders participation constraint:
q  L
 
rL + dtL + V
L
2 (tL)

+ H
 
rH + dtH + V
L
2 (tH)

;
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where V L2 (a) = da is the value of a lender who owns a units of the asset at the beginning of t = 2:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium short-term funding contract in period 1 is given by
q1 (a) =
(1 + ) da+ H
 
V B2 (a)  V L2 (a)

1  L
r1L (a) = Lq

1 (a) ; t

1L (a) = a
r1H (a) = r

1L (a) + da+ V
B
2 (a) ; and t

1H (a) = 0;
and it can be implemented by a combination of risk-free debt at zero interest and collateralized debt.
As the proposition above states, the total size of the loan the borrower can procure from the
lender in the rst period depends on the resources he can credibly pledge. Since the low return
L is pledgeable, the borrower can always commit to repay at least Lq1 in terms of consumption
goods.
By choosing to sell his assets and setting t1L (a) = t1H (a) = a, the the borrower can indirectly
pledge the assetsdividends in periods 1 and 2. Selling the asset allows the borrower to increase
the loan size in d+ vL2 per unit of asset sold, where v
L
2 is the lenders marginal valuation for the
asset in period 2.
However, transferring the asset to the lender is costly for the borrower. For each unit of the
asset the borrower transfers to the lender, he gets the lenders marginal valuation, d+ vL2 , which
is less than his own marginal valuation, d+ vB2 . Alternatively, the borrower can increase the size
of the loan in the same amount by transferring the lender d + vL2 units of consumption goods.
Thus, the borrower would rather repay the lender in consumption goods than in assets whenever
possible. This implies t1L = a, t1H = 0 and r1H > r1L = Lq1. The di¤erence in marginal
valuations referred to above allows the borrower to credibly commit to a state-contingent contract
by e¤ectively pledging part of the non-pledgeable return of his project if the high state is realized.
The additional amount the borrower is willing to pay in terms of consumption goods in order
not to loose the asset in the high state is 
 
V B2 (a)  V L2 (a)

. Then, the extra amount the borrower
can get from the lender by pledging the asset as collateral instead of selling it is:
q = H
 
V B2 (a)  V L2 (a)

> 0:
Corollary 2 In period 1, the borrower strictly prefers to pledge his assets as collateral rather than
selling them.
14
Equivalent to the implementation of the optimal contract at t = 2, the amount the borrower
repays in consumption goods in the low state, r1L (a), can be thought of as the repayment of riskless
debt at zero interest rate. The remaining part of the loan amount, qc1 (a) = q

1 (a) r1L (a), is repaid
in consumption goods only if the return of the project is high, whereas if the return is low, the
lender receives a units of the asset from the borrower. Therefore, qc1 (a) can be interpreted as a
loan collateralized by a units of the asset at an interest rate of:
ic =
r1H (a)  r1L (a)
qc1 (a)
  1 = L
 
V B2 (a)  V L2 (a)
 
da+ V L2 (a)

+ H
 
V B2 (a)  V L2 (a)
 :
The higher the di¤erence in asset valuations between the borrower and the lender, the higher the
amount of consumption goods the borrower can credibly commit to repay in the high state by
pledging his assets as collateral.
This implementation is the one with the maximum amount of collateralized debt. Then, the
maximum amount that the borrower can obtain against one unit of the asset, its debt capacity, is
given by:
D = (1 + ) d| {z }
Insurance
+ H
 
vB2   vL2
| {z };
Incentives
where vB2 and v
L
2 are the marginal valuations for the asset of the borrower and lender, respectively.
10
The assets debt capacity depends on its value as collateral for lenders when there is default (in-
surance) and on the extra value borrowers attach to the asset when there is no default (incentives).
Ceteris paribus, a higher asset value for lenders increases the loan amount since it allows lenders
to recover more in the event of default, while a higher (extra) asset value for borrowers decreases
the borrowers incentives to report untruthfully and, therefore, allows them to borrow more against
the asset.
Whenever the borrower values the asset higher than the lender, the borrower nds it less
expensive to repay the lender in goods than in assets. In other words, whenever the marginal rate
of substitution between assets and consumption goods is higher for the borrower than for the lender,
transferring the asset is costly for the borrower and the borrower strictly prefers pledging the asset
as collateral rather than selling it. The model in Section 3 emphasizes this result by considering
the case in which an asset market may be available at the end of the rst period.
10Since preferences are quasilinear in consumptino, the marginal valuations for the asset are also the marginal rate
of substitution between the asset and consumption good.
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Collateral premium The borrowers value of holding a units of the asset at t = 1, V B1 (a), is
greater that the value he would get it he sold the asset to invest in his project, i.e.,
V B1 (a) >
(E ()  L)
1  L
 
da+ V L2 (a)

:
The borrower gets an expected return on equity of (E() L)1 L per unit invested in his project.
By setting t1L = t1H = a, the borrower can sell the asset to the lender at t = 1 in exchange for the
lenders valuation, da + V L2 (a). Therefore, asset sales allow the borrower to invest
da+V L2 (a)
1 L in
his project. By pledging the asset as collateral, the borrower is able to invest an additional amount,
q. Thus, when the borrower is able to use the asset as collateral, he attaches an additional value
to it on top the assets sale value (E() L)1 L
 
da+ V L2 (a)

. The collateral premium is the expected
return on equity of the additional amount the borrower can get from the lender by pledging the
asset as collateral instead of selling it. The collateral premium is dened as follows:
V B1 (a) 
(E ()  L)
1  L
 
da+ V L2 (a)

=
(E ()  L)
1  L q
:
The collateral premium further increases the di¤erence in valuations between the borrower and the
lender and, as can be seen in the dynamic model in the extensions, it is a key determinant of the
assets debt capacity.
3 Market for the asset
In the baseline model, it is crucial for the borrower and the lender to value the asset di¤erently in
order for the borrower to strictly prefer to use the asset as collateral. This di¤erence in marginal
rates of substitutions between assets and consumption goods, which is at the center of the main
result, depends on how easy it is for the borrower and the lender to transform consumption goods
into assets and vice-versa at the end of the rst period. The model presented in this section extends
the baseline model to consider the case in which, with certain probability, the borrower and the
lender are able to access a competitive asset market. The assets market liquidity, that is, the
probability with which this market is available, is a crucial determinant of the marginal valuations
for the asset and of the funding liquidity and collateral premia.
The model is the same as the baseline two-period model described in Section 2 except that,
with probability , at the end of t = 1 a continuum of ex-ante identical borrowers and lenders can
trade in a competitive asset market. As in the baseline model, at t = 2 borrowers are indi¤erent
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between selling their assets or pledging them as collateral. Thus, a borrowers valuation for a units
of the asset at the beginning of t = 2 is:
V B2 (a) =
E ()  
1  L da;
while a lender values a units of the asset V L2 (a) = da.
3.1 Asset market
If the asset market is open at the end of t = 1, which occurs with probability , a borrower with
assets a and wealth w will buy x units of the asset to solve the following problem:
V mkt (a;w) = max
x
V B2 (a+ x) + w   px; (1)
subject to
px  w
x   a;
where p is the price in of the asset in terms of consumption good. The rst constraint above is
the borrowers budget constraint: he cannot pay more for his purchases than the resources he has.
The second constraint above implies that the borrower cannot sell more units of the asset than the
ones he owns. The wealth level w is the residual project return after paying the lender.
A borrower with assets a and wealth w has a demand for the asset given by:
xB (a;w) =
8>>><>>>:
 a if p > vB2
2
h
 a; wp
i
if p = vB2
w
p if p < v
B
2
:
Given the linear structure of the problem in (1), a borrower will (i) sell all of his assets if the asset
price p is above his marginal valuation for the asset, (ii) he will buy as many assets as he can if his
marginal valuation for the asset is greater than the price, and (iii) he will be indi¤erent between
buying or selling otherwise.
If the aggregate assets held by borrowers are aB and their aggregate wealth is wB, the borrowers
aggregate demand in the asset market is:
XB (aB; wB) =
8>>><>>>:
 aB if p > vB2
2
h
 aB; wBp
i
if p = vB2
wB
p if p < v
B
2
:
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Similarly, a lender with assets a and wealth w has a demand for the asset given by:
xL =
8>>><>>>:
 a if p > vL2
2
h
 a; wp
i
if p = vL2
w
p if p < v
L
2
and the lendersaggregate demand in the asset market is:
XL (aL; wL) =
8>>><>>>:
 aL if p > vL2
2
h
 aL; wLp
i
if p = vL2
wL
p if p < v
L
2
;
where aL are the lendersaggregate asset holdings and wL is their aggregate wealth.
Since vB2 > v
L
2 , borrowers are buyers in the asset market and lenders are sellers. And since there
is a xed supply of assets and a xed supply of goods, the price in the competitive asset market is
determined by cash-in-the-market pricing. Thus, the equilibrium asset price p is given by:
p = max

vL2 ;min

wB
aL
; vB2

:
The price p depends on the liquidity available in the asset market, i.e., on the ratio between the
available consumption goods held by the borrowers (buyers) and the available assets held by the
lenders (sellers). The higher this ratio, the higher the price p.
Finally, if the asset market is open, the value of holding a units of the asset and wealth w for a
borrower is:
V mkt (a;w) = V B2

a+
w
p

while the value of a lender is pa+ w.
Remark. The asset market structure described above can also be interpreted as the result
of a market in which there are search or matching frictions, as follows. Let  be the probability
with which a borrower and a lender meet. Upon meeting, the terms of trade between them are
determined through Nash bargaining, where the bargaining power of the borrower is  2 [0; 1].
This market structure and the competitive one described above are isomorphic if the bargaining
power of the lender and the borrower is chosen appropriately. More specically, if the bargaining
power of the borrower is set to:
 =
vB2   p

 
vB2   vL2
 :
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3.2 Funding market
At t = 1, the borrower chooses his funding contract, taking into account that with probability 
he will be able to use the proceeds from his project to purchase assets in the asset market.11 Let
wi  iq   ri + d (a  ti) be the borrowers wealth at the end of t = 1 in state i. A borrower with
assets a solves the following problem:
max
q;rL;rH :tL;tH
(1  )  H  wH + V B2 (a  tH)+ L  wL + V B2 (a  tL)
+ 

HV
mkt (a  tH ; wH) + LV mkt (a  tL; wL)

;
subject to the feasibility constraints in equation (2), the incentive compatibility constraint in the
high state:
(1  )  wH + V B2 (a  tH)+ V mkt (a  tH ; wH)
 (1  )  wL + (H   L) q + V B2 (a  tL)+ V mkt (a  tL; wL + (H   L) q) ;
the incentive compatibility constraint in the low state if lying is feasible, i.e., if rH  Lq+d (a  tL),
(1  )  wL + V B2 (a  tL)+ V mkt (a  tL; wL)
 (1  )  wH + (L   H) q + V B2 (a  tH)+ V mkt (a  tH ; wH + (L   H) q) ;
and the lenders participation constraint:
q  H (rH + dtH) + L (rL + dtL) + 

H V^
L
2 (tH) tH + LV^
L
2 (tL) tL

;
where
V^ L2 (a) =

(1  ) d+ p



a;
is the expected value of holding a units of the asset at the end of t = 1 for the lender in terms of
t = 2 consumption.
The solution to the borrowers problem stated above leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Borrowers strictly prefer to pledge the asset as collateral rather than selling it if
and only if  2 [0; 1). If  = 1, borrowers are indi¤erent between the two options.
When the asset market is not available at the end of t = 1, i.e.,  = 0, the borrower prefers
to pay the lender in terms of consumption good rather than in assets. In this case, as in the
11For simplicity, the funding contract cannot be contingent on whether the asset market is open.
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baseline model, the marginal rate of substitution between assets and consumption goods di¤ers for
borrowers and lenders. For each unit of the asset the borrower transfers to the lender, the lender
is willing to increase the loan size by vL2 . This transfer costs the borrower v
B
2 . Alternatively, the
borrower could get the lender to increase the size of the loan in vL2 by transferring v
L
2 units of
consumption good, which would cost him only vL2 . Since v
L
2 < v
B
2 , it is less costly for the borrower
to pay the lender in consumption goods than to pay him in terms of assets.
If the asset market is always available at the end of t = 1, i.e.,  = 1, the borrower is indi¤erent
between repaying the lender in terms of assets or consumption goods. For each unit of the asset
he gives the lender, the lender is willing to increase the size of the loan in p. Alternatively, the
borrower could attain the same increase in loan size by transferring p units of consumption good
to the lender. However, the borrowers opportunity cost of this transfer is not being able to buy
one unit of the asset in the market.
When the asset market is randomly available, i.e.,  2 (0; 1), in expectation it is less costly for
the borrower to repay the lender in consumption goods than in assets. In other words, transferring
the asset to the lender is costly for the borrower in expectation. Analogously to the baseline model,
whenever transferring the asset to the lender is costly for the borrower, the borrower strictly prefers
to pledge the asset as collateral and only transfer it to the lender if he cannot remit compensation
in consumption goods.
3.3 Premia and liquidity
The ease with which an asset can be traded, that is, its market liquidity, is a key determinant of
the equilibrium valuations for borrowers and lenders. In the model described in this section, the
asset is perfectly liquid at the beginning of each period t since the borrower can always sell the
asset to the lender by setting tL = tH . The assets market liquidity at the end of the rst period
depends on the likelihood of the asset market being open, i.e., on the parameter . The higher
the probability that the asset market will open at the end of t = 1, the higher the assets market
liquidity in the future.
Denition 4 An assets market liquidity is determined by the likelihood with which it can be traded
at t = 1, i.e., by the parameter .
The parameter , which from now on I will refer to as the assets market liquidity, a¤ects
the borrowersand lendersvaluation for the asset and, through them, the (funding) liquidity and
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collateral premia.
The value a borrower assigns to selling the asset to raise funds, the assets sale value, is given
by:
E ()  L
1  L

1 + 

vB2
p
  1
 
d+ v^L2

a;
where

1 + 

vB2
p   1

is the borrowers expected marginal value of a unit of consumption good
at the end of the rst period before he knows whether the asset market is open.
The value a borrower assigns to using the asset as collateral, the assets collateral value, is:
Sale value +
E ()  L
1  L H

vB2  

1 + 

vB2
p
  1

v^L2

:
In this model, I dene the liquidity and collateral premia as in the baseline model. The liquidity
premium is the di¤erence between the sale value of the asset and its fundamental value, i.e., the
sum of its discounted dividends. The collateral premium is the di¤erence between the collateral
value of the asset and its sale value.
As the following proposition shows, the assets liquidity a¤ects the liquidity and collateral premia
in opposite ways.
Proposition 4 An increase in the assets liquidity at the end of the rst period, i.e., an increase
in : a) Increases the funding liquidity premium, and b) decreases the collateral premium.
An increase in the assets liquidity increases the borrowers sale value of the asset through two
channels. First, a higher  increases the probability a lender gets a price p  d for the asset
at the end of the rst period. This (weakly) increases the lenders valuation of the asset and, in
turn, the amount the borrower can obtain from the sale of the asset. Second, by increasing the
probability with which a borrower can use the proceeds of his investment to buy assets, it increases
the borrowers value of holding funds at the beginning of the rst period. These two channels imply
a higher liquidity premium since they lead to a higher di¤erence between the sale value of the asset
and its fundamental value.
On the other hand, an increase in the assets liquidity decreases its collateral premium since
it decreases the di¤erence in the marginal rates of substitutions between assets and consumption
goods for both borrowers and lenders, i.e., it decreases vB2  

1 + 

vB2
p   1

v^L2 . The lower this
di¤erence, the less costly it is for the borrower to transfer the asset to the lender and the lower
the additional value the borrower attaches to being able to use the asset as collateral. Figure 2
illustrates these results.
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Collateral Premium
Liquidity Premium
Collateral value: vB1
Sale value: E() L1 L (1 + (
vB2
p   1))(d+ v^L2 )
Fundamental value: (1 + )d
Asset liquidity - 
Figure 2: Asset liquidity and premia
Remark. The liquidity of the asset at the end of the rst period depends on . However, as
mentioned above, the asset is perfectly liquid at the beginning of the period since the borrower can
always choose to sell his assets to the lender by setting tL = tH = a. As illustrated in this section,
the borrower will choose to pledge his liquid nancial asset to raise funds as long as the asset is not
perfectly liquid at the end of the period.
Assuming  < 1 implies that there is a state of the world in which the asset is illiquid and there
is no market in which it can be traded. This is a reasonable assumption given the evidence of market
freezes. Market freezes were recurrent during the last nancial crisis. However, they can also occur
in less extreme situations even in markets for the most liquid assets. For example, in July 2015,
U.S. Treasury debt, which is widely used as collateral in repo markets, became increasingly harder
to trade in response to binding capital constraints faced by banks. According to the Financial
Times, "banks pulled back from quoting prices, while other traders reduced their presence during
the most extreme moments of turmoil, impairing the ability of investors to transact cash bonds."
Similarly, the liquidity in the U.S. Treasury debt market decreased notably in 2013 in anticipation
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of the tapering of the Federal Reserves quantitative easing policy.12
More generally, any transaction cost or friction that imposes a wedge in the marginal rates of
substitution between assets and consumption goods for the borrower and the lender will lead to
the borrower strictly preferring to use the asset as collateral rather than selling it.
4 Long-term contract
So far, I have restricted the set of contracts to short-term contracts. In this section, I show that
focusing on short-term contracts is without loss of generality because the sequence of optimal
short-term contracts in the baseline model implements the long-term contract that satises the
participation constraints for the lender in periods 1 and 2.
Denition 5 (Long-term Contract) A long-term contract  consists of:
1: A loan amount in period 1, q:
2: Loan amounts in period 2 contingent on the report in period 1, qL and qH :
3: Repayments in terms of the consumption good
in period 1, contingent on the report in period 1, rL and rH
in period 2, contingent on the reports in periods 1 and 2, rLL, rLH , rHL, and rHH :
4: Repayments in terms of assets
in period 1, contingent on the report in period 1, tL and tH
in period 2, contingent on the report in periods 1 and 2, tLL, tLH , tHL, and tHH .
As in the case of the short-term contract, in equilibrium a long-term contract has to be feasible
and incentive compatible. These conditions are expressed in the following borrowers problem as
constraints 1   3: Finally, I assume that the lender can walk away from the contract at any time
and, therefore, his participation constraints have to be satised in periods 1 and 2. These are
constraints 4 and 5 below. The borrower chooses a long-term contract to maximize his expected
utility:
max
 
E () q   L (rL + dtL)  H (rH + dtH) + (1 + ) da
+ 
X
i=L;H
i (E () qi   L (riL + dtiL)  H (riH + dtiH)  dti) ;
12See "U.S. Treasuries market faces liquidity concerns", Financial Times, July 29, 2015 and "Liquidity deteriorates
for U.S. Treasuries", Financial Times, November 23, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.ft.com/. Last accessed April
1st, 2016.
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subject to:
1. Feasibility constraints at t = 1 and t = 2:
2. Incentive compatibility constraints at t = 1 :
 rL   dtL +  (E () qL   dtL   L (rLL + dtLL)  H (rLH + dtH))
=  rH   dtH +  (E () qH   dtH   L (rHL + dtHL)  H (rHH + dtHH)) :
3. Incentive compatibility constraints at t = 213:
riL + dtiL = riH + dtiH , i = L;H:
4. Participation constraint for the lender at t = 1:
q +  (LqL + HqH)  L (rL + dtL) + H (rH + dtH)
+
X
i=L;H
i (dti + L (riL + dtiL) + H (riH + dtiH)) :
5. Participation constraint for the lender at t = 2:
qi  L (riL + dtiL) + H (riH + dtiH) , i = L;H:
In contrast to the case in which only short-term contracts are allowed, using long-term contracts
allows the borrower to directly contract on the loan amounts at t = 2. However, since these
amounts depend on the resources that can be pledged at t = 2 through the feasibility and incentive
compatibility constraints, asset transfers are a way of indirectly contracting on loan amounts. In
fact, the optimal long-term contract can be implemented by a series of short-term contracts.
Proposition 5 The optimal short-term contracts implement the optimal long-term contract.
The proof follows directly from the characterization of the optimal long-term contract in the
Appendix.
The second-best long-term contract, the contract that ignores the participation constraints for
the lender in period 2, implies qH > LrHL + LrHH and rH > rH . Since the borrower cannot
commit to repay more than Lqi+da in the second period, he would like to pre-pay the lender for a
13Risk neutrality implies that the incentive compatibility constraints at t = 1 and t = 2 can be expressed as one
constraint, as stated in points 2 and 3:
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higher loan at t = 2. This higher loan at t = 2 also imposes a higher penalty for lying and therefore
increases the initial loan amount q. However, lenders would never be able to credibly agree to this
contract if they could walk away from it.
Remark. The optimal contract described here resembles the optimal contract in Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990). However, there are key di¤erences between the assumptions and results in their
paper and the ones presented here. In this paper the presence of a long-lived nancial asset allows
for lending to occur with short-term contracts. In fact, the existence of a long-lived nancial assets
implies that a sequence of short-term contracts can achieve the same allocation as the optimal
long-term contract which, as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), involves the rm not being operated
if the low state is realized. Moreover, in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), the rm itself is pledged as
collateral by allowing it to be liquidated in the event of a bad report. Therefore, the asset used as
collateral is needed in order for the rm to operate and, thus, cannot be sold if it wants to continue
operating. In my model, the project available to the borrower are inalienable and the nancial asset
that is used as collateral in equilibrium is unrelated to the operations of the rm. This implies that
the borrower can choose to sell his assets and still be able to invest in his project, which is crucial
to answer why assets are used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds.
5 Extensions
In this section, I present several extensions to show the robustness of the main result and the
economic intuition behind it. All the extensions are departures from the baseline model presented
in Section 2 in which the funding contract is restricted to a short-term contract. First, I consider
risky long-term assets and allow the assets dividends and the projects returns to be correlated.
Second, I allow for stochastic investment opportunities. This extension highlights the role that the
persistence in the roles as borrower and lender play in the main result. Finally, I introduce a fully
dynamic innite horizon model.
5.1 Correlated dividends and returns
In the baseline model I assumed the nancial asset was riskless. However, many risky assets are
used as collateral in nancial transactions. For example, mortgage back securities (MBS) were
massively used as collateral to nance new mortgages or real estate related securities at the onset
of the 2008  2009 nancial crisis. This extension allows for risky nancial assets whose dividends
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may be correlated with the returns of the project operated by the borrower. I show that, consistent
with the widely spread use of MBS as collateral, assets with payo¤s highly correlated with the
investment opportunity are better collateral.
Consider the baseline model presented in Section 2 with the only di¤erence being that the
assets dividend is stochastic and it is potentially correlated with the return of the borrowers risky
project. Although the dividends are paid at the end of each period, after the borrower invests
in his risky project, they are known at the beginning of each period. This implies that there is
only uncertainty about the dividend paid by the asset in the second period. The assets dividend
distribution is such that:
E (d2j1 = i) = di, for i = L;H;
and
E (d2) = HdH + LdL = d:
Given a dividend d2 at t = 2, the borrowers problem in the second period remains the same.
The value of a borrower who holds a units of the asset at the beginning of the second period is:
V B2 (a; d2) =
E ()  L
1  L d2a:
Analogously, the value for the lender of holding a units of the asset at the beginning of the second
period is:
V L2 (a; d2) = d2a:
Given that the value functions for the borrower and the lender are linear in the dividend level,
it is easy to see that all the results in the baseline model generalize to this extension. In particular,
the assets debt capacity becomes:
D = d1 +  d+ H

V B2 (a; dH)
a
  V
L
2 (a; dH)
a

:
The following proposition shows that assets with dividends that are more highly positively
correlated with the borrowers project are better collateral.
Proposition 6 Assets that have dividends that are more highly positively correlated with the risky
project have a higher debt capacity, i.e.,
@D
@dH j d
> 0:
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In the model, the nancial asset partly resolves the non-contractibility of the return on the risky
project by allowing the borrower to raise funds. Since in equilibrium the borrower values the asset
more than the lender does, V B2 (a; dH)   V L2 (a; dH) is the endogenous cost of defaulting on the
promised amount, rH   rL, which allows the borrower to credibly commit to truthfully reporting
the projects return. An asset that has dividends that are more highly positively correlated with
the return of the risky project has a higher dH , which implies a higher cost of default for borrowers.
This higher cost of default allows the borrower to commit a larger amount of consumption goods in
the high state and, thus, increases the debt capacity of the asset, which makes it better collateral.
5.2 Stochastic investment opportunities
In the baseline model, I assume that a borrower always has access to an investment opportunity
while a lender can never invest in it directly. This assumption can be relaxed to allow for proba-
bilistic access to the risky project. Doing so emphasizes the importance of the persistence of the
investment opportunities discussed for the baseline model in Section 2.
The next model is the same as the baseline model with the exception that now the borrower
remains a borrower (and the lender remains a lender) with probability . An agent who has a
borrowing opportunity in the rst periods keeps his investment opportunity in the second period
with probability  while an agent without a lending opportunity in the rst period acquires one
in the second period with probability (1  ). Whether an agent has access to an investment
opportunity or not in a certain period is known at the beginning of that period. Agents who are
endowed with an investment opportunity do not get any endowment of the consumption good.
The only di¤erence between the borrowers and lenders problems in this setup and those in the
baseline model is in the continuation values they face in the rst period. In the baseline model, each
agent knows in which side of the market he will participate next; in the current model, their role in
the economy is random. Therefore, everything derived in the baseline model holds by substituting
V B2 (a) by:
V B2 (a) + (1  )V L2 (a)
and V L2 (a) by:
V L2 (a) + (1  )V B2 (a) :
Analogous to the baseline case, a borrower will only choose to transfer the asset in the high
state if the lender values the asset at least as much as he does. The next proposition formalizes
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this nding.
Proposition 7 The borrower will strictly prefer to use the asset as collateral if and only if invest-
ment opportunities are persistent, i.e., if  > 0:5.
Since having the asset is more valuable while having access to an investment opportunity, the
borrower will value the asset more than lender only if his likelihood of being a borrower the next
period is higher than the lenders. Therefore, as long as the investment opportunities are persistent,
the borrower will always choose to use the asset as collateral rather than selling it.
Suppose that  > 0:5. Then, the debt capacity of the asset is given by:
D = d+ 
 
vL2 + (1  ) vB2

+ H (2  1)
 
vB2   vL2

:
As in the baseline case, the debt capacity has two components: one that provides insurance to
the lender and one that provides incentives to the borrower. The lender is always willing to lend
his own valuation for the asset, d + 
 
vL2 + (1  ) vB2

, if the loan is collateralized. The lender
knows that defaulting is costly for the borrower. He also knows that the borrower has incentives
to pay more in the high state to avoid losing the asset. Thus, the extra amount that the borrower
is willing to pay in the high state is  (2  1)  vB2   vL2 .
5.3 Dynamic model
I extend the baseline model to an innite horizon model. By taking into account the feedback
of future collateral premia on the current collateral value of an asset, it allows me to show that
longer-lived assets are better collateral.
In the innite horizon model, time is discrete and goes on forever. There are two risk-neutral
agents, a borrower and a lender, with the same endowments as the ones described for the baseline
model in Section 2. In fact, each period t is exactly the same as the one described in Figure 1.
Assumption 2 (Impatience dynamic) The discount factor  satises  E() L1 L < 1.
Analogous to Assumption 1 in the baseline model, Assumption 2 implies that the borrower will
always choose to consume consumption goods rather than saving them. Therefore, I can ignore the
borrowers saving decision. Moreover, if Assumption 2 does not hold, the borrower always chooses
to postpone consumption to the following period, which, in the context of an innite horizon model,
implies he never consumes while getting an innite value from doing so.
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Since the amount of asset in the hands of the borrower and the lender may change over time,
the aggregate state variable of the economy is given by the distribution of the asset in the hands
of borrowers and lenders. Let V B (aB; aL) and V L (aB; aL) be the value functions for the borrower
and lender, respectively, when the borrower has aB units of the asset and the lender has aL units
of the asset. The borrowers problem becomes:
V B (aB; aL) = sup
q;rL;rH ;tH ;tL
E () q   H (rH + dtH)  L (rL + dtL) + daB (2)
+ HV
B (aB   tH ; aL + tH) + LV B (aB   tL; aL + tL) ;
subject to the funding contract (q; rL; rH ; tL; tH) being feasible and incentive compatible, and sat-
isfying the lenders participation constraint:
q + V L (aL; aB)  HrH + HV L (aL + tH ; aB   tH)
+LrL + LV
L (aL + tL; aB   tL) : (PC)
Since the borrower has all bargaining power in the funding market,
V L (aL; aB) =
d
1  aL. (3)
Since V L (aL; aB) is linear in aL and does not depend on aB, the value function for the borrower
at the beginning of each period only depends on his own asset holdings. Thus, in a slight abuse
of notation, I denote the value functions for the borrower and lender as V B (aB) and V L (aL),
respectively. Looking at the borrowers problem in equation (2), it is easy to see that the funding
contract will not depend on the lenders asset holdings either.
Denition 6 A recursive equilibrium in this economy is a value function for the borrower, V B (aB),
and a value function for the lender, V L (aL), and a funding contract
fq (aB) ; rL (aB) ; rH (aB) ; tL (aB) ; tH (aB)g
such that 2 and 3 are satised.
I next focus on recursive a¢ ne equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the value functions are a¢ ne
in asset holdings. Within this class of equilibria, the equilibrium is unique. All omitted proofs are
in the Appendix.
In an a¢ ne equilibrium,
V L (a) = vLa; and V B (a) = vBa:
The following Lemma characterizes the borrowers optimal contingent asset transfers.
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Lemma 2 In an a¢ ne equilibrium, a borrower will choose
tL = aB; and
tH =
8>>><>>>:
aB if vB < vL
x for some x 2 [0; aB] if vB = vL
0 if vL < vB
:
If the borrower assigns the same value to the asset as the lender, he will set tL = tH = aB and
"sell" the asset to the lender. In exchange, the lender will lend the borrower vL = vB, which is fair
compensation from the borrowers perspective.
However, if the borrower assigns a higher value to the asset than the lender, he would be getting
less than his valuation if he chose to sell the asset to the lender: the lender would still pay a price
vL per unit where now vL < vB. In this case, the borrower will only transfer the asset if he cannot
avoid it, i.e., if the low return is realized and he does not have enough resources to compensate
the lender in consumption goods. Transferring the asset is costly for the borrower since he gets
vL units for it while he values it vB > vL. This di¤erence in valuation can be interpreted as the
"punishment" for not being truthful, which induces truth telling and makes the state contingent
contract incentive compatible.
The following proposition establishes the main result that liquid nancial assets are used as
collateral for the dynamic model.
Proposition 8 In the unique a¢ ne equilibrium the borrower strictly prefers to use the asset as
collateral rather than selling it.
In equilibrium, the borrower assigns a higher value to the asset than the lender. Holding assets
allows the borrower to take advantage of his protable investment opportunity either by selling
the assets, by pledging its dividends or by pledging the assets themselves. The lender, in contrast,
can only consume the dividends or sell the asset in the asset market. E () > 1 implies that the
borrower assigns a higher value to the asset than the lender. Since investment opportunities are
persistent, the borrower will value the asset more than the lender in the future as well.
Analogous to the baseline model, whether the borrower strictly prefers to use the asset as
collateral depends on the assets market liquidity. The results obtained in Section 3 extend to the
dynamic version of the model presented here.
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5.3.1 Premia
As in the baseline model, one can decompose the additional value the borrower attaches to the asset
over its fundamental value in two premia: a funding liquidity premium and a collateral premium.
The fundamental value of the innitely-lived asset is d1  . If the borrower sells the asset to the
lender at the beginning of the period, he gets d+ cL consumption goods. The borrower can lever
up against this amount and then invests in his risky project. Therefore, the borrower expects a
return E() L1 L on the the proceeds from the asset sale. This implies that the liquidity premium is:
E ()  L
1  L (d+ cL) 

d
1  

=
E ()  1
1  L
d
1   > 0:
Analogously to the baseline two-period model, the funding liquidity premium is equal to the levered
excess return times the fundamental value of the asset.
The marginal value the borrower attaches to using a unit of the asset as collateral is vB. Then,
the collateral premium is:
vB   E ()  L
1  L (d+ cL) =
E ()  L
1  L q
,
where
q = H (vB   vL)
is the extra amount of funds the borrower can raise by pledging the asset as collateral rather
than selling it. As in the two-period model, this additional amount depends on the di¤erence in
valuations for the asset between the borrower and the lender. However, in the innite horizon
model, this di¤erence in valuation incorporates not only the liquidity premium in the next period
but also all future collateral premia. The following proposition formalizes this argument.
Proposition 9 The collateral premium of an innitely-lived asset is larger than that of a two-period
asset. More generally, the collateral premium is increasing in the duration of the asset.
If the borrower expects to use the asset as collateral in the future, he attaches a higher value to
using it as collateral today. Giving up an innitely-lived asset is costlier to the borrower than giving
up an asset that only lives for one additional period. The cost of transferring the longer-lived asset
includes, not only losing the assets liquidity premium but also all future collateral premia, which
are not part of the cost of transferring the shorter-term asset. This implies that the borrower can
credibly commit to transfer more consumption goods to avoid losing the longer-lived asset than he
is to avoid losing a shorter-term one. The longer the duration of the asset the higher the value of
the asset as collateral and the higher its debt capacity.
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6 Conclusion
Why are liquid nancial assets used as collateral instead of being sold to raise funds? I show that
when the roles as borrowers and lenders are persistent, and the return on the risky project is non-
contractible, a borrower chooses to collateralize liquidity to raise funds. For each unit of the asset
the borrower gives the lender, the borrower receives the lenders valuation in consumption good.
Since the borrower values the asset more than the lender, transferring the asset to the lender is
costly for the borrower. O¤ering the asset as collateral allows the borrower to transfer the asset
only if he does not have enough resources to repay the lender in consumption good and, therefore,
the borrower prefers to collateralize his liquid assets rather than selling them.
This di¤erence in asset valuations between the borrower and the lender is an equilibrium out-
come. In autarky, both the borrower and the lender value the asset as the expected discounted
sum of the assets dividend stream. When the agents are able to trade, the borrower values the
asset more than the lender and they both value the asset (weakly) more than its fundamental
value. The borrowers excess valuation can be divided in two premia: a funding liquidity premium
and a collateral premium. A crucial determinant of this valuation di¤erence across agents is the
assets market liquidity. As long as the asset is not perfectly liquid in the future, the borrower and
the lender value the asset di¤erently and, thus, the borrower strictly prefers to use the asset as
collateral rather than selling it. The liquidity and collateral premia are a¤ected in di¤erent ways
by the assets liquidity. An increase in the likelihood of trading the asset, i.e., and increase in its
liquidity, increases the liquidity premium while it decreases the collateral premium.
Changes in margins and haircuts played an important role in the recent crises (See Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), Perri and Quadrini (2014)). Having a model that characterizes these objects as
equilibrium outcomes is important both from a positive and a normative point of view. In positive
terms, it is interesting to see where the nancial shocks come from and how they interact with the
economys fundamentals. From the normative side, policies that aim at stabilizing the cycle and
preventing nancial crises should take into account what drives changes in the nancing conditions
faced by nancial intermediaries, rms, and households. This paper delivers some of the insights
needed to further understand collateralized debt markets.
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7 Appendix
This section contains all proofs omitted in the main text.
7.1 Proof of Proposition 2
This proposition is a special case of Proposition 11 in Subsection 7.3 when  = 0. All proofs
omitted in Section 2 are special cases of the proofs in Subsection 7.3 when  = 0.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of this proposition follows directly from the characterization of the long-term contract
in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 In the optimal long-term contract  :
1. The loan amounts are:
q =

1 +  + H
(E ()  1)
1  L

da
1  L ,
qH =
da
1  L , and q

L = 0:
2. Repayments in terms of consumption good are:
rL = Lq
, rH = r

L + da+ 
(E ()  1)
1  L
da
1  L ,
r2L = 0, and r

2H = Lq

H :
3. Asset transfers are:
tL = a, t

H = 0, t

2L = 0, and t

2H = a:
Proof. Note that the participation constraints for the lender will hold with equality. Using the
incentive compatibility constraints and the participation constraint in the rst period, the objective
function for the borrower becomes:
(E ()  1)

rL + dtL +  (dtL + r2L + dt2L) + HE ()

d (tL   tH)
1  L

+ (1 + ) da:
This implies:
tL = a, t

H = 0, t

2L = 0
r2L = 0, and r

L = Lq
:
Using these expressions in the participation and incentive compatibility constraints gives the con-
tract in the proposition.
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7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of this proposition follows directly from Lemmas 5 and 6 in this section interpreting
contingent asset transfers as collateralized debt and non-contingent ones as asset sales.
The borrowers problem in (1) can be considerably simplied by inspecting the constraints.
First, in any equilibrium, the participation constraint for the lender will hold with equality. If it
did not, the borrower could increase the loan amount and increase his expected utility without
violating any of the additional constraints. Similarly, as is usual in this kind of problems, the
incentive compatibility constraint will bind in the high state. Finally, in order to maximize the size
of the loan, the repayment in terms of goods and assets in the low state, rL and tL, will be the
maximum possible, i.e., rL = Lq and tL = a. The Lemmas 3, 4, and 5 formalize these results.
Lemma 3 Without loss of generality, the lenders participation constraint can be replaced by:
q = H (rH + dtH) + L (rL + dtL) + 

H V^
L
2 (tH) + LV^
L
2 (tL)

in the borrowers problem.
Proof. Since the objective function of the borrower is increasing in q, if the participation constraint
does not hold with equality, the borrower can always improve on the contract by increasing the
loan quantity q and still satisfy all other constraints.
Lemma 4 Without loss of generality, the incentive compatibility constraint in the high state can
be replaced by:
(1  ) (rH + dtH   (rL + dtL)) = 

V B2

a  tH +  Hq rH+d(a tH)p

  V B2

a  tL +  Hq rL+d(a tL)p

in the borrowers problem.
Proof. Suppose that the incentive compatibility constraint does not hold with equality, i.e.,
(1  ) (rH + dtH   (rL + dtL)) < 

V B2

a  tH +  Hq rH+d(a tH)p

  V B2

a  tL +  Hq rL+d(a tL)p

:
Then, the borrower could increase q, rH , and rL and increase the objective function while still
satisfying all other constraints. In particular, there exists "0; "1 > 0 such that:
(1  ) (rH + dtH   (rL + dtL) + (H   L) "0)
 

V B2

a  tH +  rH+d(a tH)p

  V B2

a  tL +  rL+d(a tL)p

;
(1  ) (rL + dtL   (rH + dtH)  (H   L) "0)
 

V B2

a  tL +  rL+d(a tL)p

  V B2

a  tL +  rH+d(a tH)p

and
q + "0 + "1 = H (rH + H"0 + dtH) + L (rL + L"0 + dtL) + 

H V^
L
2 (tH) + LV^
L
2 (tL)

:
Then, the contract fq + "0 + "1; rL + L"0; rH + H"0; tLj ; tHjg satises the feasibility, participation
and incentive compatibility constraints while attaining a higher asset value for the borrower.
In the next few pages, I will ignore the incentive compatibility constraint in the low state and
then verify it is satised.
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Lemma 5 In the optimal contract, rL = Lq and t

L = a.
Proof. Using Lemmas 3, Lemma 4 and the linearity of V2, the borrowers problem can be rewritten
as:
max
q;rH ;rL;tH ;tL
(1  )

(E ()  1) q + 

H V^
L
2 (tH) + LV^
L
2 (tL)

+ da

+V B2

a  tH + Lq   rH + d (a  tH)
p

+ L (1  ) ;
subject to the feasibility constraints, the incentive compatibility constraint
(1  ) (rH + dtH   (rL + dtL)) = 

V B2

a  tH +  rH+d(a tH)p

  V B2

a  tL +  rL+d(a tL)p

;
and the participation constraint for the lender
q = (rL + dtL) + 

H V^
L
2 (tH) + LV^
L
2 (tL)

+
H
1  

V B2

a  tH +  Hq rH+d(a tH)p

  V B2

a  tL +  Hq rL+d(a tL)p

:
q in the participation constraint of the lender and, thus, the objective function are increasing in rL
and tL. Moreover, increasing either rL or tL relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint in the
high state. Therefore, any contract such that rL < Lq or tL < a can be improved upon.
Lemma 6 In the optimal contract, tH = 0 as long as  2 [0; 1) and If  = 1, tH 2 [0; a].
Proof. From Lemma 5, we have wL = 0 and tL = a. Then, the borrowers problem can be written
as
max
tH
(1  )HwH + HV B2

a  tH + wH
p

;
where:
wH = Hq   rH + d (a  tH) ,
and rH and q are respectively implicitly dened as a function of tH from the incentive compatibility
constraint
(1  )

rH(1 L)+dtH(1 L) LHv^L2 tH LLv^L2 a da
1 LL

= V B2

a  tH +  Lq rH+d(a tH)p

(4)
and the lenders participation constraint
q =
H
 
rH +
 
d+ v^L2

tH

+ L
 
d+ v^L2

a
1  LL : (5)
The rst order condition with respect to tH is:
H

(1  ) + v
B
2
p

dwH
dtH
  HvB2 ;
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where:
dwH
dtH
=
@wH
@rH
@rH
@tH
+
@wH
@tH
=  
 

(1 )(E() L)(1 LL)+v
B
2
p (1 L)HH

v^L2 +(E() 1)vB2

1 LL HL v^
L
2
p

(1 LL)(1 L)

(1 )+v
B
2
p
 ; (6)
where I used the implicit function theorem, Eq.(4) and Eq.(5). Then, the rst order condition in
Eq.(6) becomes:
H
(E ()  L)
(1  L)

(1  )

d^  vB2

+ V B02

v^L2
p
  1

.
For all  2 [0; 1) ; the rst order condition is negative since:
v^L2   vB2 = (1  )
 
d  vB2

+ 

p

  vB2

< 0, and
v^L2
p
  1 = (1  )d+ p
   p
p
=
(1  ) (d  p)
p
 0:
Therefore, the borrowers chooses tH = 0.
If  = 1, the rst order condition becomes
H
(E ()  L)
(1  L) v
B
2

v^L2
p
  1

= 0;
since v^
L
2
p   1 = 0 and the borrower is indi¤erent between any value of tH 2 [0; a]. Note that since
rL = Lq and rH > rL, not reporting the truth in the low state is not feasible and the incentive
compatibility constraint in the low state can be ignored.
Proposition 11 Choosing a funding contract at t = 1 where
q1 =
a
1  L
0@d+ 
0@ d^+ H  vB2   v^L2 + L

vB2
p   1

v^L2
1 + 

vB2
p   1

1A1A
r1L = Lq

1, r

1H = Lq

1 + da+
vB2 a 
(1  ) + vB2 

t1L = aB, and t

1H = 0:
is optimal for the borrower. This is the unique optimal contract if  2 [0; 1).
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemmas 5 and 6 in this subsection.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The liquidity and collateral premia the borrower attaches to the asset at t = 1 are, respectively,
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
E ()  1
1  L (1 + ) d+
E ()  L
1  L 
 
v^L2   d

+
E ()  L
1  L 

vB2
p
  1
 
d+ v^L2

(LP)
and
E ()  L
1  L H

vB2  

1 + 

vB2
p
  1

v^L2

: (CP)
From the expressions in LP and CP, it is easy to see that:
dLiquidity Premium
d
=
E ()  L
1  L 

1 + 

vB2
p
  1

p

  d

+
E ()  L
1  L

vB2
p
  1
 
d+ v^L2

> 0
and
dCollateral Premium
d
=
 E ()  L
1  L H

vB2
p
  1

v^L2 +

1 + 

vB2
p
  1

p

  d

< 0
since 
p

  d

> 0 and

vB2
p
  1

> 0 for all  2 [0; 1) :
7.5 Proof of Proposition 6
The assets debt capacity is given by:
D = d1 + 
V L2
 
a; d

a
+ H

V B2 (a; dH)
a
  V
L
2 (a; dH)
a

:
Since V
L
2 (a;d)
a = d,
@D
@dH j d
= H

E ()  L
1  L   1

= H
E ()  1
1  L > 0:
7.6 Proof of Proposition 7
As long as the borrower values the asset more than lender at the end of period 1, the borrower will
nd it costlier to transfer the asset to lender and, thus, strictly prefer to use the asset as collateral.
This happens when:
V B2 (a) + (1  )V L2 (a) > V L2 (a) + (1  )V B2 (a) ;
which is the same as 0:5 < ; since V L2 (a) < V
B
2 (a) :
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7.7 Proof of Proposition 8
This proof of follows directly from the Proposition 13 at the end of this section which requires the
characterization of the equilibrium in the dynamic model. The following Lemmas and Proposition
characterize the optimal contract in the dynamic version of the model and yield the proof of
Proposition 8.
By inspecting the constraints in the borrowers problem, it can be considerably simplied. First,
in any equilibrium, the participation constraint for the lenders participation constraint will hold
with equality. If it did not, the borrower could increase the loan amount and increase his expected
utility without violating any of the additional constraints. As is typical in this kind of problems,
the incentive compatibility constraint will bind in the high state and ICH will hold with equality.
Finally, in order to maximize the size of the loan, the repayment in terms of consumption good in
the low state, rL, will be the maximum possible, i.e., rL = Lq+daB: Lemmas 7, 8 and 9 formalize
these arguments.
Lemma 7 Without loss of generality, PC can be replaced by:
q + VL (aL) = H (rH + dtH) + HV
L (aL + tH)
+L (rL + dtL) + LV
L (aL + tL) ; (7)
in the borrowers problem.
Proof. Let V  be the solution to the borrowers problem. Let fVjgj0 be such that limj!1 Vj =
V , where:
Vj = E () qj   H (rHj + dtHj)  L (rLj + dtLj) + daB
+ HV
B (aB   tHj) + LV B (aB   tLj)
for some feasible and incentive compatible fqj ; rLj ; rHj ; tLj ; tHjg that satises the participation
constraint PC: Suppose that for some j  0, (qj ; rLj ; rHj ; tLj ; tHj) is such that PC is slack. Then,
one could increase qj and increase Vj to V 0j while still satisfying all the other constraints. Letn
V 0j
o
j0
be a sequence identical to fVjgj0 if at (qj ; rLj ; rHj ; tLj ; tHj) PC holds with equality and
V 0j otherwise. Then, by construction, V
0
j  Vj and therefore,
lim
j!1
V 0j  lim
j!1
Vj = V
:
Therefore, I can replace PC by Eq.(7) in the borrowers problem.
Lemma 8 Without loss of generality, the incentive compatibility constraints can be replaced by:
  (rL + dtL) + V B (aB   tL) =   (rH + dtH) + V B (aB   tH)
in the borrowers problem.
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Proof. Let V  be the solution to the borrowers problem. Let fVjgj0 be such that limj!1 Vj =
V , where:
Vj = E () qj   H (rHj + dtHj)  L (rLj + dtLj) + daB
+ HV
B (aB   tHj) + LV B (aB   tLj)
for some feasible and incentive compatible contract fqj ; rLj ; rHj ; tLj ; tHjg that satises the partic-
ipation constraint in Eq.(7) : Suppose that for some s  0, no incentive compatibility constraint
binds. Then, there exists "s > 0; such that:
V B (aB   tHs)  V B (aB   tLs)  rHs   rLs + (H   L) "s
rHs   rLs + (H   L) "s  
 
V B (aB   tHs)  V B (aB   tLs)

:
Replace fqs; rLs; rHs; tLs; tHsg by fqs + "s + "0; rLs + L"s; rHs + H"s; tLj ; tHjg ; where "0 > 0
is such that the participation constraint binds. This contract still satises all the constraints, but
it attains a value V 0s > Vs:
If rHs > rLs, ICH is the only relevant incentive compatibility constraint. For all s such that
rHs > rLs and ICH is not binding, the previous argument applies and a value V 0s > Vs can be
attained.
Now consider those s  0 such that rHs  rLs < Lqs + daB: If ICL binds, I could keep
rHs   rLss constant by increasing both rLs and rHs and by increasing qs to keep the participation
constraint binding, which would result in an increase in the objective function. Let this new value
be V 0s . If for s  0, rHs  rLs = Lqs + daB, ICL does not bind unless ICH binds. Suppose ICL
binds and ICH does not. Then, I could increase rHs while still satisfying incentive compatibility
and relaxing the participation constraint. Therefore, I could increase qs, which would increase the
objective function and give a value V 0s  0. Therefore, I could construct a new sequence
n
V 0j
o
j0
,
V 0j  Vj , such that V 0j = Vj is the incentive compatibility constraint in the high state binds and
V 0j = V
0
j if it does not. By construction,
lim
j!1
V
0
j  lim
j!1
Vj = V
:
Therefore, without loss of generality I can concentrate on those sequences that are feasible in which
ICH holds with equality, i.e.,
rHj   rLj = 
 
V B (aB   tHj)  V B (aB   tLj)

for all j: (8)
Lemma 9 Without loss of generality, the feasibility constraints on the contingent transfers in con-
sumption good can be replaced by:
rL = Lq + d (a  tL) and rH  0
in the borrowers problem.
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Proof. By assumption, q  e will not bind in a solution to the borrowers problem. Using Lemma
7, the participation constraint can be assumed to hold with equality, and using this in the objective
function it is easy to see that the objective function is always increasing in the amount of the loan
q. Using Lemma 8; the incentive compatibility constraint holds with equality, which implies that
the upper bound for q is given by the maximum amount that can be repaid in the low state, i.e.,
by rL = Lq + d (a  tL) :
Let V  be a solution to the borrowers problem. Let fVjg be a sequence such that limj!1Vj =
V  and where:
Vj = (E ()  1) qj + HV L (aL + tHj) + LV L (aL + tLj) + daB
+HV
B (aB   tHj) + LV B (aB   tLj)  V L (aL) (9)
for some feasible and incentive compatible that satises Eq.(8) ; and PC with equality, that is that,
rLj = qj   
 
HV
L (aL + tHj) + LV
L (aL + tLj)
  dtLj
 H
  
V B (aB   tHj)  V B (aB   tLj)

+ 
 
V L (aL)

(10)
rHj = qj   
 
H
 
V L (aL + tHj)

+ LV
L (aL + tLj)
  dtHj
 L
 
V B (aB   tLj)  V B (aB   tHj)

+ V L (aL) : (11)
Then, for all j; the contract can be summarized by fqj ; tLj ; tHjg . The feasibility constraints for rL
and rH imply the following constraints on qj :
qj 
daB + 
 
HV
L (aL + tHj) + LV
L (aL + tLj) jL

1  L ;
+
H
 
V B (aB   tHj)  V B (aB   tLj)
  V L (aL)
1  L ; (12)
qj  HV L (aL + tHj) + LV L (aL + tLj)
+H
 
V B (aB   tHj)  V B (aB   tLj)
  V L (aL) ; (13)
qj  daB + HV
L (aL + tHj) + LV
L (aL + tLj)
1  H
+
L
 
V B (aB   tLj)  V B (aB   tHj)
  V L (aL)
1  H ; (14)
qj  HV L (aL + tHj) + LV L (aL + tLj)
 L
 
V B (aB   tHj)  V B (aB   tLj)
  V L (aL) : (15)
Construct the following sequence
n
V 0j
o
: if fqj ; tLj ; tHjg is such that Eq.(12) holds with equality,
set V 0j = Vj : If fqj ; tLj ; tHjg is such that Eq.(12) is slack, let V 0j be the value attained by the contract
that satises Eq.(12) with equality. Since the transfers in terms of consumption good are dened
by Eq.(10) and Eq.(11), this contract is still incentive compatible and feasible. Moreover, q0j > qj
and V 0j > Vj : Therefore,
lim
j!1
V 0j  lim
j!1
Vj = V

and without loss of generality I can concentrate on the sequences fVjg as dened above in Eq.(9),
such that the loan quantities fqjg satisfy Eq.(12) with equality. Having this constraint hold with
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equality implies that rLj = Lqj + daB. Since qj  0 always, all contracts along this sequence
satisfy rL > 0, which is the same as satisfying Eq.(13) with strict inequality:
Suppose that for some j Eq.(14) holds with equality. This implies rHj = Hqj and since
rLj = Lqj , this implies that the participation constraint is slack, and that the producer is giving
the non-producer all the gains from the project. From Lemma 7, there exists a feasible and
incentive compatible contract that attains a higher value that contract j and therefore, without
loss of generality I can ignore sequences in which for some elements j, Eq.(14) holds with equality.
Using the Lemma 9, the borrowers problem in the funding market reduces to choosing only the
two asset transfers.
Corollary 3 In an a¢ ne equilibrium, the borrowers problem can be rewritten as:
V aB (aB; aL) = sup
(tH ;tL)2[0;aB ]2
(E ()  L)
1  L daB
+
(E ()  L)
1  L 
 
HV
L (aL + tH) + LV
L (aL + tL)  V L (aL)

+
(E ()  1)
1  L H
 
V B (aB   tH)  V B (aB   tL)

+
 
LV
B (aB   tL) + HV B (aB   tH)

;
subject to:
q =
daB + 
 
HV
L (aL + tH) + LV
L (aL + tL)

1  L
+
H
 
V B (aB   tH)  V B (aB   tL)
  V L (aL)
1  L
q  maxf0; HV L (aL + tH) + LV L (aL + tL)
 L
 
V B (aB   tH)  V B (aB   tL)
  V L (aL)g:
Proof. It follows directly from Lemma 9.
Lemma 10 In an a¢ ne equilibrium,
vB =
(E ()  L)
1  L

d+ 

HvL
@tH
@aB
+ LvL
@tL
@aB

 (E ()  1)
1  L HcB

@tH
@aB
  @tL
@aB

+HvB

1  @tH
@aB

+ LvL

1  @tL
@aB

: (16)
Proof. Using Corollary 3, in an a¢ ne equilibrium, the value of a borrower who enters the loan
market with aB units of the asset and is matched with a lender with aL units of the asset is:
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V B (aB) = max
tH ;tL2[0;aB ]2
(E ()  1) q + daB +  (HvLtH + HvLtL)
+HvB (aB   tH) + LvB (aB   tL)
+ (vB   (d+ vL)) ;
subject to:
q =
daB + vL (HtH + LtL)  HcvB (tH   tL)
1  L (17)
q  max fvL (HtH + LtL) + LvB (tH   tL) ; 0g (18)
rH = q
   HvLtH   LvLtL + LvB (tH   tL)  dtH
rL = q
   HvLtH   LvLtL + HvB (tH   tL)  dtL:
Given the a¢ ne specication of the utility functions, the solution to the borrowers problem
will be in corner solution. If the constraint in Eq.(18) is ignored, there are four possible solutions:
tL = 0 = tH , tL = 0 and tH = aB, tL = aB and tH = 0, and tL = aB = tH : If tL  tH then the
constraints on q are satised. If tL < tH , Eq.(18) might bind. Suppose Eq.(18) binds, then,
daB + L (HvLtH + LvLtL)
cB
= tH   tL: (19)
If rH = 0,
q = cL (HtH   LtL) (1  L) + LdaB
and using the denition of q together with Eq.(11) ; this implies:
q =
LdaB +  (HvLtH + LvLtL) (1  HL)
1  L :
Putting these last two equations together gives:
 (HvLtH + LvLtL) (2  H   L) L =  LLdaB;
which implies HvLtH+LvLtL < 0; a contradiction. Therefore, Eq.(18) cannot bind in equilibrium
and using the guessed functional form for V B (aB) and matching coe¢ cients gives the result.
The following four lemmas characterize the optimal funding contract.
Lemma 11 In equilibrium, tL 6= 0:
Proof. Suppose tL = 0 in equilibrium. If the objective function is decreasing in tL, then it is
also decreasing in tH : Therefore, tL = 0 implies tH = 0. The coe¢ cients of the value functions in
Eq.(16) in Lemma 10 would become:
vB =
(E ()  L)
1  L
d
1  
where the marginal valuation of the asset depends on the state only through the dividend level d
(and are linear in it).
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The derivative of the objective function with respect to tL is:
(E ()  L)
1  L LvL +
(E ()  1)
1  L HvB   LvB:
If tL = 0 and tH = 0 this becomes:
(E ()  L)
1  L
L
1  

(E ()  L)
1  L
d
1  

+
(E ()  L)
1  L
(E ()  1)
1  L H

d
1  

;
which is > 0 and therefore contradicts tL = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 The proof of this Lemma follows from the rst-order conditions of the
borrowers problem in the funding market using Lemma 10 and Lemma 11.
Lemma 12 tL = aB = tH is not an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose tL = aB = tH in equilibrium. Then, we would have vB =
(E() L)
1 L (d+ vL),
which yields vB =
(E() L)
1 L
d
(1 ) : Moreover, this implies
vL   vB =

 (E ()  1)
1  L
d
1  

< 0;
which implies that the derivative of the objective function is decreasing in tH and, thus, tH = 0;
which is a contradiction.
Proposition 12 In the only a¢ ne equilibrium, tL = aB and t

H = 0.
Proof. From the previous lemmas in this section, the only candidate left for equilibrium is tL = aB
and tH = 0: Assume t

L = aB and t

H = 0. Then, Eq.(16) becomes:
vB =
(E() L)
1 L (d+ LvL)
1  H (E() L)1 L
: (20)
To have tL = aB and t

H = 0 be chosen by the producer, the objective function must be
increasing in tL and decreasing in tH ; i.e., the FOC with respect to tL is
E ()  L
1  L LvL   LvB +
E ()  1
1  L HvB > 0
and the FOC with respect to tH is
E ()  L
1  L  (vL   vB) :
The sign of the derivative of the objective function with respect to tH depends on the sign of
the di¤erence in marginal valuations between the borrower and the lender. This di¤erence can be
rewritten as:
vL   vB = d
1     vB <


1  E() L1 L

1  H (E() L)1 L
d
1   < 0:
Therefore, if the contract implied by tL = aB and t

H = 0 is a solution to the borrowers problem
in the funding market.
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Proposition 13 In an a¢ ne equilibrium, the optimal loan contract (q; rL; r

H ; t

L; t

H) is given by:
q =
(d+ LvL + HvB)
1  L aB
rL = Lq

rH = r

L + vBaB
tL = aB, t

H = 0:
Proof. The proof follows directly from the lemmas and propositions in this section.
7.8 Proof of Proposition 9
Suppose there are T periods in the economy. If there is only one period left in the economy, as is
the case in the baseline model, the collateral premium is:
E ()  L
1  L H (vB;T   vL;T ) = H
E ()  L
1  L
E ()  1
1  L d;
where vi;t is the is the marginal value of the asset for agent i = B;L at the beginning of period t.
Note that:
vB;T 1 =
E ()  L
1  L (d (1 + ) + H (vB;T   vL;T )) ;
since at T   1, holding the asset allows the borrower to pledge the assets dividends, to credibly
commit to repay the lender (vB;T   vL;T ) if the high state is realized and to lever up this amount.
Then, if there are s+ 1 periods left, the collateral premium is:
E ()  L
1  L H (vB;T s   vL;T s) =
E ()  L
1  L H
0@ 1  (H)s
1  H E() L1 L

1A E ()  1
1  L d:
The derivative with respect to s is:
E ()  L
1  L H
0@  (H)s ln (H)
1  H E() L1 L

1A E ()  1
1  L d > 0;
since H < 1.
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